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buckeye broadband supports c-span as a public servicelong with these other providers, giving you a front row seat to democracy. our co-op next, a group of generals and admirals from the six branches of the u.s. military discuss modern welfare -- warfare and preparedness. topics include collaboration within the military and industry and lessons learned from regions and conflicts such as the indo pacific and the russia ukraine war. this discussion was part of the center for strategic and international studies global security forum. it's about an hour and 20 minutes. >> ladies, we are back. thank you for joining us. i would like to introduce dr. seth jones, senior vice president and director of the international security program here at csis.

seth has done work on the defense industrial base, china, ukraine, israel-gaza, terrorism, many themes likely to come up in his panel discussion. we are fortunate to be joined by all six vice chiefs of staff of the military services. the theme of today's forum is gathering strength, how we must use american strength to navigate these security challenges facing our country. our military forces are a source of american strength, but our military advantage is not guaranteed. the panel will discuss what it takes to maintain that advantage and prepare for the environment we are facing. i am pleased to hand off to seth . dr. jones: thank you and thanks to all the team who put this security forum together. where we sit, for those of you just joining us, is we started off looking at broad strategic

questions. we will move from this from the intelligence picture to the thoughts of the chairman of the joint chiefs, and we will move in the afternoon to the defense industrial base and then emerging technologies. the theme of the global security forum really does pick up on winston churchill's the gathering storm, as carrie mentioned earlier. his book the gathering storm, which came out in 1948, looked at geopolitical changes. i am in the middle of reading andrew roberts' 1000 page biography of churchill. it also feels a little likely the churchill position in the 1930's where he is looking at german rearmament and pushing the u.k. to take the threat seriously, which much of the leadership in the house of commons and within 10 downing

street does not take the threat seriously, which puts the british in a difficult position as the germans start to move on poland and other countries. i would like to start with general mingus first, then general mahoney, then open up to anybody else. i want to start with the current war's both in ukraine and the middle east. the focus of the panel -- thanks to all of you for joining -- is on the future of warfare, but part of the question is, what are you seeing, general mingus, as you look at ukraine, now in its third year? i was over there a few weeks ago to talk to senior ukrainian forces about innovation. there is a lot there. we would certainly fight differently. in many ways we have different cap abilities, precision

strikes, logistics, electronic warfare. when we move over to the middle east, the active war in gaza, the back and forth fighting we have seen along the lebanese-israel border, the red sea dimension, the iranian strikes against israel and the israeli response. as you look at where we are and where we have come from following the russian invasion, what are you seeing in terms of some of the primary lessons from the current wars and how are you looking at adapting and evolving the army based on those? gen. mingus: i would start with 2014 instead of 2022. 2014, a lot of people forget that that's when this really started. we have had teams embedded in europe and ukraine since the original incursion in 2014. it has obviously gone to a different level after 2020 two.

we continue to pull all those things. we embed those in our combat training centers. i will go back to the gap analysis we did in 2015. our adversaries have watched us for a long time and as such to the conclusion they don't want to get into a close fight with united states. they have developed a series of tactics where they want to sense further, shoot further, disrupt us further so they don't have to experience the close fight component. the proliferation of technology, the fact you can't hide anywhere. there, land, sea, space. we are trying to learn from that. where we are trying to go inside the army is the ability to counter that. it boils down to command and control, long-range precision fires, how we keep pace with

technology when it comes to unmanned systems, how we pull that together in the way we will fight today and in the future. working with the services here today, a lot of the lessons are universal but at the end of the day we have to match the adversary when it comes to long-range precision fire and command and control. dr. jones: if i could follow up, one item that the war planning concept highlights is the war fighting maneuver. how are you thinking about the maneuver? gen. mingus: the cornerstone behind the joint fighting concept 3.0 is the term expanded maneuver. we have expanded the definition of maneuver. maneuver in the classic sense is geographical, movement and fire. you move to replace better fire on the adversary and you place fire on the enemy so you can move and those things are inextricably linked.

you can also move in cyberspace, in space. you can have effects in cyber and air. the classic definition of maneuver, which is one of the nine principles of war, has expanded and we have to embrace that. dr. jones: general mahoney, i wonder if we could come to you next, then i'm going to move to the red sea and open to anyone else. gen. mahoney: maybe just a couple of fill ins on a great response from my fighting mate. the first thing is if you are facing a confident adversary, the idea of short and sharp conflict is probably a thing of the past. if we look at ukraine two years plus on, that has been the definition of not short and sharp. when we go to the red sea, we can talk about our counter moves against the houthis.

they are difficult to uproot. protraction in time is a foregone conclusion and that connotes the requirement to remove, reset, repair, reintegrate into the fight. it also connotes depth, which we see right at the forefront of ukraine with the national security supplemental just past. if we think that is going to be limited in time due to our choosing, we may want to think again. the second was brought up with a different perspective, observation. you will be seeing in the individual spectrum, dem spectrum, so you have to integrate the ability to either camouflage, deceive, maneuver in order to make that observation less consequential. we are seeing that in spades in the ukraine-russia example.

may be specific to marine corps capabilities, in the black sea and certainly the red sea, but all of it can be contained to the black sea until we move on, is the idea of land impacting the c word maneuver space. small, distributed units with the ability to sense and fire has sunk at least 13, 15 russian ships. nelson said a ship is a full to fight a port. when they did, they figured out that maxim, though old, is still true. mahan said without protection from the landward side, you have a fortress fleet where the fleet cannot sortie much beyond its protection from the land. we have seen that happen in the black sea where the russians have enabled a corridor to open up and enabled more freedom of

movement by the ukrainians. small, maneuverable distributed units that have long-range precision flyers is a big lesson for us. dr. jones: one follow-up is one of the challenges both with the russians and ukrainians as the war has been protracted is there industrial bases and ensuring that forces on the ground have sufficient artillery fire, air defense capabilities. how do you think, as we look toward the possibility of protracted conflict, how are you thinking about, whether it is stockpiles or the broader industrial basin, some of the challenges we have? gen. mahoney: i think on the far backside, you need to have an industrial base that can produce at scale right now war ramp up

quickly to build that depth of magazine. we have to have the ability to source those weapons at the time and place of our choosing. you need a different relationship right now between the operating forces as it goes back through to the defense industrial base. you just wrote a piece on empty bins about the timeframe through wargames where we would go through some of our preferred munitions in a matter of days, if not weeks. there has to be an appreciation for that on the military side and the defense industrial base side. >> can i throw a red flag for pandering to the moderator? [laughter] i am not done, jim. [laughter] i am just starting. [laughter] dr. jones: i have lost control

of the panel right now. >> i want to make a comment and then i will go to the red sea piece. i won't quote mahan but i will quote steve majewski from 2020 when we did a panel about force design from the marine corps. he said something about flipping the script. we tend to think of marines going from sea to shore and that flips this script. what's happening in the black sea as evidence to that effect, that we should look forward and think about, and you are doing that and we should do that. from a red sea perspective, it takes a joint force. everybody brings something to that game. the navy brings a mobility aspect with the marine corps when we don't have basing rights that are helpful. and we didn't at the beginning of this conflict. we found every day we have to

adapt. the adversary was going to adapt , change their tactics, watch us. we should assume that's going to happen and get better. what we have to do from a technology perspective is tighten up the data reduction and introspection of, did the system perform as we thought it would? if it didn't, what can we do about that? did the humans perform as they thought we would? if they didn't, what can we do about that? and provide that lesson to the fleet. to me there is a quick learning cycle that can be applied, now aided by technology to take that data reduction, send it to shore, and see what the system did. that is to our benefit. we should use it for every ounce we can provide. dr. jones: one issue that has come out of the red sea is we are certainly trading off when we shoot down drones or cruise

missiles, some pretty expensive systems for particularly some of the drones. the ua asked has some pretty cheap ones. how are you thinking about, as you look to the future, ways to counter you af -- uaf that is a slightly better trade-off on cost? >> there is definitely emphasis on counter uas. navies focused on it from both a shore and ship perspective. we need to do more work there. when people learn me into that discussion, i pushed back and say the crew of a ddg is worth more than that. where we are now, we have a shot, we should take the shot. we put those commanding officers in a very tight box where they have 10 to 15 seconds to make the decision. let's encumber that, and you put your ship in a position where

you can maximize the effect of that. and then let's go reflect on this and figure out a better way to do this through some directed energy, electric warfare, high-power things in the future. i think we are looking at that and we appreciate the quickness of our system to look at the ability for some of our electronic systems libraries to update them and that has increased the pace in the red sea. the intelligence community has played in this and reached the same parody as us with our combat systems. i think we just have to keep doing that. >> if i could add a couple of things on counter uaf's, it is an acute threat we are putting a lot of time and resources to figure out how to counter that. longer term, it has to be viewed through the broader mr. defense architecture because it is defending through the air.

the way all the services have looked at that problem is we defend points on the ground or a spot on the ground or a critical asset or something fixed. we have to change that approach and look at it more likely would in a typical defensive posture where you establish engagement areas and you have things that can disrupt and break, and you have that last line of defense. we are the same way when you look at the engagements. a missile is relatively expensive but i would never question an operator, do i shoot at 20 kilometers or wait until it is one or two kilometers out? so you are never going to sacrifice decision-making at the tactical level. >> the flexibility of the joint force to readapt and provide additional layers should not be lost on an aircraft. shooting down cruise missiles from the air force, navy, and marine corps. to me that's another thing to do what jim said, let's not put

ourselves in the box. >> this jim, by the way. >> there is a couple of us. >> it's going to get confusing. >> we like to sit together to confuse people. dr. jones: i wanted to open up to see if there were any other comments on this issue. >> what i would offer, first, thanks and having read your really excellent -- [applause] [laughter] frankly should have been a pulitzer prize winner in my opinion. dr. jones: you are just trying to get softball questions. adm. kirby: the best way to deter is to be perceived as being prepared to fight. as we think about the strategic environment, where in many ways these are the inner warriors. you started off talking about the gathering storm. what was going on during the gathering storm? the spanish civil war. there were a lot of lessons to be learned in the spanish civil

war. you wonder whether things like ukraine and what is going on in gaza and the red sea, is this the spanish civil war of our era? shame on us if we don't learn the lessons we need to learn to more effectively deter so we don't have the storm that may be gathering. when you look at lessons we ought to be learning right now, i think for the air force, for a long time we boastfully said no american has been killed by air attack since 1953. we can't say that anymore, and we can't say that because our traditional conception of what things like air can -- air superiority mean have changed. quad copters with a hand grenade can kill an american just as easily. as we think about what air

superiority means in an era of proliferated small uaf's and one way attack drones and so forth, i think there are some lessons to be learned. we are soaking that up right now. the other thing, general mingus talked about movement and firepower. one thing you can look at in ukraine is it is the return of firepower. the reason it has become so bloody is because of the lack of ability to maneuver. one component of that is the inability of both sides to achieve air superiority in the face of a proliferated air threat and formidable air defenses. i think there are some lessons we can be learning and frankly

are. you asked about the exchange ratio. our coalition forces had a pretty successful weekend a couple weekends ago against a really concerted iranian attack on israel. you asked about exchange ratios. some of what was shot down was shot down with bullets. 20 millimeters shells coming out of the front end of a fighter. that is a pretty favorable cost exchange. i don't know that that is scalable, but we are thinking about, as general mingus talked about, this layered defense. i think it showed the value of our work several weeks ago. dr. jones: if i could ask one follow-up, because you mentioned air superiority. one of the challenges in areas like the pacific is in and around bases.

how are you thinking about air superiority in the construct of base defense? including air defense. i realize this pulls at least the army into this response as well. how are you thinking about the joint this that is necessary -- jointness? to guam, for example. >> guam is a particular case study, but it's a broader question than that. one of the comparative advantages i think the u.s. enjoys, and there are a host of them, capital markets is a comparative advantage. innovation in the commercial marketplace is an advantage. empowered ncos and petty officers across the joint force are a competitive advantage. another one of our comparative

advantages are our ability to operate jointly. i can tell you on the topic of air defense specifically, there is not a closer relationship than that specifically between the army and the air force inside the department right now of jointly attacking this problem, looking at the analysis of what are the most effective ways to contribute to air defense, and i am encouraged by oz leveraging one of our comparative advantages, which is our ability to work jointly. dr. jones: either of you on current wars? we will come back to lots of other questions. >> to build on what jim just talked about, we are seeing that more than we have ever before and i think it is something that our near peer adversaries counted on against us. they did not think we would be

able to fight joint or with our allies or commercial partners. what we are learning from not only what's going on in the middle east but especially ukraine is we are bringing all this to bear simultaneously on adversaries, but the adversary is also bringing similar to bear against us. it is requiring us to be more integrated in network going forward and that is where we are spending our energy. >> in our roles as vices, we find ourselves in similar forums where we meet and discuss problems at a joint level. we also go to the dmac, a similar forum, to do that. i think acknowledging the reliance on each other from a program perspective, like i need some stuff that the spaceports is going to give me if i am

going to close the long-range fire or the air force. that understanding requires us to be a little less parochial and more thoughtful. the effort that has been going on for quite some time is an imperative. how we get there is what we need to focus on so we collectively can benefit from each other. >> a micro example of a success story we jointly share with the marine corps -- i'm sure other services have them -- going back to your question about industrial base and lessons learned, pre-conflict 155 artillery, one of the principal things we have been providing to ukraine, and they have extended an excess of 2 million rounds of 155. prior to february 2022 we were producing about 14,000 rounds a month. we quickly moved to 18,000, 24

thousand, this month we will produce 30,000, by the end of this year we will be at 50000 and with the supplemental last night we will be at 100,000 rounds by next summer. a huge success story working with our industrial partners we have ramped up to a level commensurate with the need. dr. jones: you going to jump in as well? >> i was going to offer that we are proud of our status as a fighting force as well as part of the joint force. you may be surprised the united states coast guard is present in every continent and embedded in every command. there is no greater representation than the six coast guard cutters and the advanced interdiction team and the training teams we have operating in the fifth fleet and arabian gulf. for us, it is an away game, how do we fight forward? but also, how do we ensure resiliency domestically?

that is another component, what are we doing domestically to ensure america's resiliency if there is a conflict? for us it is maritime resiliency, port infrastructure. how do we protect port infrastructure from threats, both malign state and nonstate actors? i want to put that on the table because it's an important component that we not lose sight of the fact there is going to be a huge domestic component to it and that component will involve military services, northcom leveraging coast guard responses, but also how we leverage the interagency to support war fighting. dr. jones: we talked a little about ukraine and the middle east. can you talk a little about the arctic? it is an area that has become increasingly contested. we have seen russian transit in

waters recently, including with some pretty sensitive materials. what does this area look like as well? this may be a navy question too. >> first it starts with the value we provide to the joint force and continue on. i think that's where the coast guard thrives and where we provide the greatest return on investment. we see that in the indo pacific, helping to build capability there but also provide a presence. we do that around the world. perhaps where we see the greatest geostrategic competition is in the arctic. i am not discounting other areas, but for us as a matter of homeland security and homeland defense, we look at the arctic. we see increased human activity because of conditions and we

need to be present to make sure that the arctic, which is ocean space, has good maritime governance, that sovereign rights and sovereignty are protected and the rule of law is respected and we are losing ground because we don't have the icebreaking capability of some competitors. russia has 40 plus icebreakers and wants to increase the fleet. china is building icebreaking capability for the north and the south. we have one heavy icebreaker and one medium icebreaker. the good news is we are full speed ahead on constructing new heavy icebreakers for the united states, not just coast guard cutters but national strategic assets. in fy 2024, we also were given authority and money to bring into the coast guard fleet a

commercially available icebreaker. we will be limited to the arctic only. that is a sign that the administration and congress support expanding the fleet because presence does matter. dr. jones: if i could pick up on one issue, general koolen-de, that you mentioned earlier, one of the interesting things we have seen, and this probably cuts across all devices here, is the role of the private sector has probably evolved. even ukraine, we have seen on the cyber side companies become directly involved. we have seen companies become involved in providing software. we have seen commercial space companies. how are you seeing the private sector evolve? what are the challenges but also the opportunities with the role of the private sector? gen. guetlein: a couple of

things. jim talked about the fact we have universal lessons. commercial is a universal lesson. if you look at partners from the civil war forward, industry partners have always been there and always pulled us out of the fire when fighting got tough. they made sure we had the material we needed, helped take care of the homeland when we were deployed forward. it's not a new lesson but it's a lesson that has become more acute with space. when we went into the middle east, we can tell you the title x. these were allies, commercial partners, etc. when you go into space, those lines go away. there is no delineation, even to the point where russia has said anyone in space is going to be a target. i can no longer say that's an international or dod asset, don't touch it.

we are all operating under the same real estate under the same threats. the other thing we are learning is in space, innovation on the industry side is going gangbusters. we are seeing more innovation come out of space today then we have since the race to the moon. i cannot build kit fast enough to get ready for the threats, therefore i better learn how to partner with allies and our industry partners. we just published the commercial space strategy two weeks ago and that says pretty much anywhere we can buy it, we are going to buy it before build it and strengthen those partnerships as much as we can. it goes back to the universal lessons. every other domain has a universal component. we have the universal marines, the civil air, all of them. in space, we now need a commercial augmented space

reserve, which is going to allow us during times of peace to build powers with industry to share intel to tell them how to defend their systems so when times of conflict,, we already have the infrastructure, the contracts in place and are off and running as a partner from day zero. >> where i see a need to leverage industry better is data analytics and ai. we all collect a lot of dadoes length have not been able to harness that as well as we could and make it usable. there are a lot of emerging technologies we need to harness because it's about fighting smarter. you can use data analytics and ai help with targeting to become more efficient and more effective and therefore safer as well. i am encouraged about where industry is going. i think we just need to catch up a little. >> we are seeing that in

reconnaissance, machine learning , seeing that across the entire spectrum of service that we need during times of crisis. >> another example of why this is so critical -- jim three mentioned cgsg2. dr. jones: jim three is the one that gave you the thumbs up. >> it is not a person, place, or thing. the c stands for combined, the j and a stand for a joint all domain, and command and control has been the integrating function of all the seven joint functions. it is one of the critical components of how we fight as a combined joint force. underpinning that is the network we are developing together. cja is making sure we move forward. our partners out there -- mike was talking about the space component.

the data layer, the application layer of the network. the data and transportation layer of the network is the most profound portion of how we are going to change. we have built things so we can take it to the edge, but if we get the data and transfer layer right, there will be a day when the end-user device is all we have to carry to the edge. >> >> you hit it but it is predicated -- on the environment. let me give you an example. on the way to get that audit, we had 24 different databases and systems. they all said kind of the same thing. transacting from a liability side to the asset side and everything in between. they all spoke in completely different digital language, different digital languages. which needed brute force to marry them up. there is no rosetta stone to

bring all of them together and make a common inference. so human intelligence had to enable the digital intelligence. when we get out this multiple layered approach to c-jad-c2. if we do not depart from a common data department we will be trying to brute force it in the face of an adversary. >> you had mentioned, jim, i think it is the strength of our nation, potentially. software, software development. how we do that. we are pretty cro-magnon, and the surface navy with our combat system. until we could update baselines. and now we have a different way to insert capability, into the baselines. it is all connected to what this common thinking is. the ability to kind of leaves that archaic model of, i am

wedded to this single vendor. and to be open to this other area is probably going to be just another, another change in how we technologically deliver capability to our military across the board. >> i want to bring in the general, i know he's talked about this including the challenges. if you take information collected off an f-35, for example, it is not always tagged or analyzed, information sometimes segregated from one another, meaning it cannot be used to create accurate service wide solutions. along these lines, can you outline the challenge first and how are you thinking about collecting and processing the data more broadly? >> yeah, you know, you are hearing it here among the vice

chiefs. we all tend to go to the, what i would describe as a 4-a's that we are after -- accessibility. when i ask a question i want to be able to access the data that allows me to answer the question that i am asking. .automation . our ability to make routine tasks that are presently done by human so they can be done by machines. we have done this in stovepipes for years, admiral till be talked about the aegis system, had the ability to operate an air defense system in an automated role for decades, frankly. so, this is not a new idea. tthe third a is analytics. we want to be able to generate insights that might not

otherwise be obvious to us. one of the examples that i have used is the amount of bus traffic, data bus traffic, that goes back and forth on an aircraft on every single flight. and at the end of the flight that traffic is discarded because it served the purpose for which was designed. but if we were to collect that data bus traffic what we might gain his analytic insights into when a part is going to break. that allows us to not order parts before we need them, but also allows the parts to be available so that it does not break. scheduled maintenance are in an aircraft is way more efficient than unscheduled maintenance. and if you wait for the part to break, by definition, you are creating unscheduled maintenance for yourself. analytics. and finally the last a is a.i.

we tend to lead to the use cases but the thing that underpins all four of these a's is data. general mingus has got it exactly right. we need common standards, we need common processes. it's a cultural problem as much as everything else, because, we have this fear that if i expose my data to the navy, somehow admiral kilby is going to figure out a way to use it to disadvantage the air force, and so, i have to protect my data from somebody else because we have parochial interests around that. we have to knock that down. and i think that is where the value of the, the degree of collaboration and teamwork the panelists here share as part of the j-roc, and all of those other venues makes all the difference in the world.

>> and it is not just altruistic. i would like to think we are all reasonable people. it is the necessity that my weapon cannot exist on my organic data. anymore. for the full completion of that flight i have to get an in-flight update, and then information from the missile for to be effective. we have to rely on each other. >> it is a necessity. >> it has been highlighted but i will just really footstomp the idea that each of us has come to recognize the reliance that we share on one another's systems, data, the architectures that we share. frankly, it has allowed us to become a more aware joint force as we understand where the elements of reliance are that allows me to go to capitol hill, for example, and talk about why

this army system is important to the air force. if that army system is not there, the air force cannot do its job. and so, we've become a more effective joint force by integrating at the data level. >> i think there is also an underlying challenge here about how we avoid -- license. one way is to have shared technologies, shared data analytics. but i also think we have to look hard at our acquisition processes to make sure they are agile enough to keep pace with changing technology. and the last thing i just mentioned is i think -- >> operating systems. >> absolutely. and i think the other dynamic tension is between owning technology as a service or buying technology as a service. i think we have to be smart about how we draw that balance. there are some services and some

technology we need to own and take responsibility for that but there are others that perhaps we can just buy as a service. i think what is required, though, is stable and predictable funding as we move forward. if we have stable and predictable funding that can project out service needs, provided we can have a strong mission needs a statement and requirements process, i think stable and predictable funding is one of the best things we can do to avoid -- lessons. >> a potential operational vignette to describe what my colleagues have talked about in the components of this. a lot of discussion about data integration and it is great for step but it insufficient. we need to move towards data replication and data reconciliation on the back end of that to get after the four a's that jim described. and most people have heard of the cockpit could of

hierarchy. every time you're given a new mission you are exposed to something you have not seen before. everybody starts off at that data layer. we climb up in knowledge and we have shared understanding and once you described it to that across a large formation, it allows leaders to then be able to visualize, assess and now you're back through that loop again. in the course of a campaign or in the course of an operation every time something changes in the environment we get dragged down into that data layer, and we have to crawl out of it. the a.i. tools will help us stay above the fray to move much much faster than our adversaries and that is the power of how when all this comes together, we will ultimately be faster than our enemy. >> i wanted to come back to the issue that we're dealing with today which is sort of the gathering storm, and to go to admiral kilby. the russian industrial base is

on a wartime footing, it is in a war, but i wonder as you look at the chinese, our general assessment is the chinese defense industrial base is on a wartime footing. that does not mean war is imminent but they are producing weapons and systems and preparing for a fight with the united states. the shipbuilding and the naval capacity is impressive at least in the capacity of the chinese to build. so, i think in the environment, in the indo pacific, in the physical environment that the u.s. is in right now, i am not sure we are going to see growth in the defense budget, and certainly the defense -- major growth, and the defense budget as percentage of gdp. if you look at the -- bill plant has repeatedly reminded many of us that the defense budget as a percentage of gdp during the cold war was at various stages

14%. even during the 1980's, over 6% between 6% and 7%. we are in the 3% range. then the fiscal environment we are in, how do you, what is competing in the maritime space look like to you? how are you working through issues like readiness and the industrial base as you deal with the chinese? >> it's a big question, right? i was talking to my staff on the way over here, historically if you look at the shipbuilding base, it went from 21 shipyards after the end of world war ii to eight now that build navy ships. our commercial shipbuilding industry is largely the same. i do not know what the fraction is of what we can build compared to china but it is crushing. so, that would take some time to pivot back to that. the secretary of navy was talking about maritime statecraft and how do we enliven the industrial base to do things

like the chinese are doing where they can build multiple ships and it is not just the navy shipyard, it is a shipyard. they can service many needs. reestablishing that balance i think we are out of balance now from a shipbuilding perspective. however, in the last panel i think they talked about the replicator process. and that is touching yards that do not build big capital ships. that can build unmanned surface vessels that can complement our forces in a hybrid way. so i think we should be thinking about it and that perspective. not to trivialize the fact that we don't need to do that -- we do need to do the former and we need to be better at it and we need to get the ships out in time and return to a system that is level, and that is predictable, and not just from a ship perspective but from a munition perspective, i will be parochial from the navy, i do not have the same confidence

that the general mingus has with army munitions in the navy. a portion. >> and we are learning those lessons. >> are you thinking about long-range? >> long-range missiles, standard missiles, sm6, sm3, we have used our first sm3 in conflict at the same event we talked about in defense of israel. those are complex, expensive munitions. we have to have some capacity there. i got comfortable in a former life as an n9 going to minimum sustained route and that is unacceptable. because right now we are in a position where we have to recertify missiles, turn those missiles quicker and build missiles faster. to me, a wholly unsatisfying -- there was a little bit of a shift, though, with things like replicators and creating this hybrid force that can work together with our other manned aircraft or ships or soldier

detachments to provide that effect. i think we just need to press into that space. we are uncomfortable what we -- but we need to press. >> this idea of expanding the industrial base, part of that is opening up our industrial base to perhaps different ways of operating. admiral kilby talked about unmanned platforms. this afternoon there will be a public announcement the air force is awarding -- >> i was going to ask you about this. you stole my question. but go ahead and ask the question. i want to give you credit for it. >> i will just say cc8 question mark. [laughter] this afternoon the air force will be announcing two option awards to vendors that have been part of our cca increment one,

um, acquisition program that has been under now for some time. and the idea here is, as autonomy and as a.i. advances, it is allowing us to do things with platforms that previously required a human inthe middle of the platform to make it happen. we are able to now move away from much as the admiral has talked about with surface vessels. we are seeing the same thing with air vessels. and so, air vehicles. so we are really excited about the opportunities that are ahead of us with this cca increment one announcement this afternoon. stay tuned. >> i appreciate the admiral highlighting the challenges of the ship card capacity, the coast guard is building several new coast guard cutters. the larger shipbuilding effort since world war ii. the navy, the coast guard and

other should not have to compete for shipyard capacity. and so, i hope we can expand the defense industrial base, but i think it goes beyond just new ship construction. it also affects ship repair. there is also limited capacity for dry docks and for the sustainability that we need to keep these assets in the fight. >> can i ask, both of you i realize there are political sensitivities to the issue of allies and partners, but we have a number of allies and partners was shipbuilding capacity. the japanese, the koreans and others, and i know -- we deploy with our japanese colleagues, they are good. how do we leverage or can we leverage allied capacity when it comes to shipbuilding? >> from my perspective, i'm inspired by our american

workforcea in our u.s. shipywards. i think they do incredible work. incredible cressman. what i would like to see is investment and expanding u.s. labor capacity. the u.s. shipbuilding industry is facing many of the same challenges we are in recruiting and retraining talent. so my hope is through the maritime statecraft initiative, which secretary del toro has included us in, we will find a way to incentivize and expand shipbuilding capacity. suit we do not have to ask that question because i do think we get incredible quality from american craftsman. >> but in order to complete the righteous cycle, whether it is industrial capacity, a means of production and a labor force to complete the cycle you have to have a plan out there that attracts workers, that can see the ability to grow from apprentice to journeyman to master. they will bring their families, they will study at your schools and worship at your church or's.

and make that cycle complete. but if you do not show them the headlines, and you are $18 an hour as a journeyman welder, why break my back in a shipyard instead of asking if you want room for cream? three years down the road, though, if that career is there, 5, 10 years down the road, if that career is there, that $18 is turned into something 3x, 4x, and you're knocking on the door of master, there is a career there. what is first, the chicken or the egg? but it is a cycle that needs to be invested in by both sides. >> that industry is going through a massive transformation about bringing that workforce into a more mature and experience workforce. it will take time and commitment for that to stick and transfer and allow us to have not five

years of experience at the supervisor level but 15 years of experience at the super liza level. we are in that space trying to rewrite that. and correct that imbalance. massive investments in the submarine industrial base to get after this, to create that because we are -- we're in it. it not just buying parts, it is building the workforce and creating the system that can meet the demands. we have now a commitment across the u.k., australia and the u.s. to take our submarine building industrial base between our three countries and make it better by making the whole better than the some of its parts. -- the sum of its parts. but there is an investment to do that. >> we got a bunch of questions from the audience. thanks to those who have asked them. i wanted to start with, i'll probably direct this to general mahoney first and opened it up

to anyone else that wants to answer it. here's the question. -- they have become ubiquitous. we talked about this but this is a more focused caution, precision fires have become ubiquitous. those capabilities, exquisitely sensors, and c2, battle management software, waveforms, algorithms are in tangibly and difficult to reveal to competitors is this a problem for deterrence? how can we credibly show china our jadc2 is better than theirs? >> think first you have to have a structure that militates towards movement, maneuver, decoys, deception, exploitation of the em spectrum and demonstrate that on a day-to-day basis. as far as conceal and reveal, that would be a choice at the

time of our choosing to where we think we would have a deterrent effect by revealing that. you all saw a picture of the armies ndtf unrolling in the philippines n ow. although the existence of the system was not new and the existence and the environment -- it has a deterrent effect. marine regiment that is able to maneuver and bring its combat power in a credible way with precision fires and the ability to importantly connect back to the fleet, connect back to the joint force, whether it is space or airborne, whether it is surface, i think is the kind of thing that will bring a deterrent. factor to the equation you gotto have it. you have to train to it. and you have to show that you have a level of confidence in it. >> on a less strategic level,

and investment across the joint force in a live virtual constructive training environment is paramount. we have been on this journey in the navy. we want to be able to train our amphibious readiness groups at sea, not attached to a range in the united states. where we can maintain currency proficiency, where we don't have to divulge our tactics, where we do not have to dive all our systems. up until recently, we have had to retract back and reset our force because we did not want people to watch our tactics. and i used the navy integrated counter fire control as an example. so the ability to do this within a security environment is first and foremost. then you have the ability to demonstrate that when you choose. but you have to have that because the training part gets lost in the sauce we talk about this. that i have to prioritize currency proficiency because at this level that is varsity ball.

and i have to train to and be proficient at it and understand it. and that is what that environment brings us. >> example of other joint projects and we work with the navy to figure out a way to to shoot -- along with some other systems out to 2000 kilometers. look at land force holding targets out to 2000 kilometers. going back to the original question. the four elements of the character work, who you fight and where you fight and what do you fight with and how do you fight with, those last two components as we think through the example of what we unveiled in the philippines, the how you fight in what you fight with, we have traditionally when we established, we commonly refer to as the manifold -- the geography associate in a constructive, and deep close or support area and those ranges have traditionally been in the close fight between 10 and 20

and 30 kilometers. all that is going to expand, how we see, where we see, how far we see in how far we can kill is moving, at ranges we have not been able to do previously. and so it is not necessarily the how, those fundamentals remain the same but what we fight with, the rangers. expansion and compression happening simultaneously is something that we have all got to figure out going forward. because even though those things have expanded, there will be potentially cyber effects or space affects in the backyard of the marine or army company or platoon that are happening in their backyard. that we have not seen before. so compression is happening in at the same time expansion. we think it is new, but if you go back to baghdad, and the density of how we were operating inside a baghdad, we did not call these things back then we would but we were operating at the complete platoon battalion levels, things that the theater forces were bringing right in those backyards. >> do you want to jump in

unrevealed? conceal? [laughter] >> if you're not going to reveal it it does not have a deterrent effect. that's really where we struggle from the space perspective is we're fairly new at this game, we do not have a lot of kit and we wrestle with how much do we want to reveal. and will it have a deterrent effect and if i'm going to reveal it, can i protect and defend it? we're constantly having that dialogue is internal. i do want to build on, there is a theme here that keeps coming through and it deals a little bit with that, is and mo said, you're going to be seen. we are going to see you. guaranteed. i do not care where you are on the planet, if you are in the arctic or the anarchic, we are going to see you. the other thing that jim said is we will be able to touch you. long-range fires are going to be able to touch you now. we are closing those killed

chains which are now becoming kill webs because of the integration among all of us to get back to the reason we get have data. -- we have data. as we get into the conversation about reveal and conceal is no longer about one service revealing or concealing something. it is about all of us revealing or concealing something to support the joint fight. it's no longer about integrating data on one platform or upgrading one platform. we are all dependent on the same platforms. we look at aegis, it has a space control or space awareness function to that. thad has a space domain function to it. if we look at what happened in the middle east with what we were able to achieve, all of those systems were integrated and networked together. we were picking out all of the launches with the missile warning system from the overhead architecture and immediately passing that down to aegis and immediately passing it down to the cockpits of our airplanes and passing it out to our allies.

so, when we start talking about the turns, -- about deterrents, we have to test and train in a virtual environment so we do not reveal a lot of our capabilities until we are ready. and then go test them and demonstrate them in a life environment. -- in a live environment to understand that ours is better than theirs. >> there's a really critical point and what the general is describing here and that is the shift that is underway from platform level integration to system-level integration. historically, we have focused on the platform. so it, if we want to, in the case of the air force if you want an airplane that has a range of this far that can see that can see this far and so forth, there are a set of direct requirement, it has to carry this much fuel and it has to have this much -- big a wing, the radar has to be this big in

the missile has to have this range. all of that is integrated at the platform level. you can pick your example from any service to see what platform level integration looks like. we are really really good at it. but there is a shift underway to system-level integration. where the censor in a different place than the shooter, is in a different place from the electromagnetic spectrum effects. all of these things have to be integrated and it becomes a much less service by service, platform by platform approach to how we are going to fight. about the character of war is changing, this is i think the shift from platform level integration to systems level integration going on across all of our services is the most fundamental shift in the character of war that is underway right now. >> and it is about the quality of data. period. the aegis system used to drive

you to the organic track, the spy quality seven and spy quality 15. those missile defense missions brought in the ability to accept a track, a track from space. now i am interested in my systems discerning the best data and the most timely data to close that fire control loop and protecting -- projecting into the future that availability of that data sometime in the future to close that to give me confidence i can expend this weapon. >> jim mentioned the other inter- war period, between world war i and world war ii, the germans had the tank and the airplane and the radio and put those three things together and between 1939 and 1941 we know what happened. all the things we have talked about, he or she who can put all of those things together in a meaningful way is going to have a distinct advantage on the adversary. >> and can maneuver based on the. -- on that. >> one broad question to all of

you and maybe we start with you, is we've seen the introduction of nuclear weapons at least being raised. the russians have rattled a nuclear saber several times. putin has in, in the ukraine war. if you look at the development, the nuclear development of the chinese, they are building nuclear capabilities. there is no question and they continue to build. nuclear capabilities. how is that impacting deterrents, but also war fighting now that we have got adversaries that are building capacities and even threatening in some cases to use them. what kind of challenge does that pose to you? how does that cause you to rethink things or has it? >> it has. and it really starts with the world we live in. we went from a bipolar balance

world to a unipolar unbalanced world and an unbalanced and multipolar environment which is going to affect all of us in terms of how we think about national security as western nations going forward. but at the end of the day, from the land force perspective, where we fit into that component of it is still mastery of all the things we just talked about. if you still have for us, squads and platoons and battalions and brigades and divisions that can close with and destroyed anybody in the world, in the most extreme lethal ways we can determine, that is still your greatest deterrent force for the adversaries that are out there. the flipside of that, those when you get into the contest of wills and the nature or separate from the character of war, and a different thing that is hard to predict when you introduce the use of strategic nuclear weapons. >> anybody else want to jump on that? >> i think we need to pay attention to it.

it is not a place where many of the conventional forces live and have experience. in the navy, it is a nuclear force that has experience in that area. we have tried to integrate that view into our conventional view and understanding what is happening. what is happening from the strategic perspective, what is happening with the adversary and what is their behavior, step up here, what does that mean, and what does it mean to me? and working across stratcom and northcom to put all of that together. is an area we are increasingly pushed into. >> i was reminded reading about it, the atomic division of u.s. looked at during the cold war that failed but was an attempt to be creative. if i could come to you, a related question but there has, there's been growing concern about the proliferation of counterspace capabi

lities that could be used to destroy space systems. how serious in your assessment are adversary counterspace capabilities, co-orbital and directed energy and how are you think about mitigating those threats? >> so, i think they are very serious threats. what makes it even more challenging is not only our near peers showing that they are capable but in many cases also they have the intent to deny our ability to use space. so that makes it for a very real threat that we are concerned about. the other thing that we are seeing is it is not a single threat. we are seeing the threat vector across multiple areas, like you said, directed her energy, direct dissent. jammers. blinders, the entire spectrum of capabilities. which makes it challenging to protect and defend.

jim started to talk about air security. and it used to be from air superiority perspective we had on denied build air superiority across the entire theater. we are not going to have that in space. what will we see is selective space superiority over various selected points in time. and that is really the way we have to start to think about space superiority because it is so big. the threat is so varied. and it is not just one country. we are seeing it across much of countries -- multiple countries and other countries are trying to get into the business. it is getting real. >> we are not trying to build the best services on the planet. we are trying to build the best joint force on the planet because we do not fight in services. we fight as a joint force. i think one of the things that is a collection of us -- the collection of us have kind of

really become deeply immersed in how interdependent we are, the thing that underpins much of this as we have talked about, is our ability to operate in and through space as well as our ability to protect our assets while at the same time degrading adversary space assets. so, how we think about things like space superiority i think is not a space force question. it is a joint force question. in the space force is clearly, you know, an integral part of that, but i think all of us have come to appreciate how dependent we are. >> one question from the audience, which i will direct to you, if that is ok, is, is it's -- one of beijing's biggest takeaways from watching russia for the last 17 years may be

that the world is much less likely to react to incremental hybrid aggression then to an outright invasion. how should the u.s. strategically address china's increasing raisson aggression in the south china sea and in southeast asia, given our partnerships and interest there. >> great question. i think it starts with illum inating the belligerent behavior and how it is inconsistent with international law. and i think the second thing is being present and meeting our partners where they are at, from the coast guard's perspective, we look at many of the pacific island nations, in particular, and frankly other nations come when you talk to them about what their greatest national security challenges are it is about protecting their exclusive economic zone, transnational criminal organizations come about dealing with the effects of climate change, and it is about how you respond to natural disasters. in all of that goes to what i

was talking about before, maritime governance. if you can be present, in a coast guard corm or a great hall or more mobile training team or law enforcement attachment, you are meeting the partners where they are, and addressing some of their greatest national security concerns, and when you do that you start to build capacity. and you start to squeeze out opportunity for other belligerent behavior. so presence matters. reinforcement of international law and approaching this from a combined perspective and not a unilateral perspective is critically important as well. so, you know, that is how i would see us competing and pushing back against some of the belligerent behavior we have seen. reinforcing the partners that we will be there, we will support, we will be present, we will engage, and we will be there in an enduring way. >> seth, if only there was

somebody on the panel that knew something about a regular work -- irregular warfare and had written about it? >> perhaps, yes. [laughter] couple of other questions, i'm not going to ask this to anybody specific but just to the group in general. this question is, how are the services addressing recruitment shortfalls? how are you dealing with some of the personnel challenges you have across the services? >> well, you are looking at me. i will take that one. there are two sides. getting the force you want and at least from the beginning stages. to assess people and recruit them and the other is to keep them. in the marine corps, our retention rates have been at historic levels for the first term. retention and our goals for subsequent professional

reenlistment are at high levels, accession for all of us has been really really hard. the recruiting command calls at headwinds but our approach is pretty simple. you have a brand-new protect it. you have standards and you don't lower them. what we do is we take the best officers and staff nco's we have, we board and qualify and train them and put them into the recruiting force. we incentivize them on the front end to volunteer, we incentivize them in the job and when they get out, we incentivize them as well. and what we have found when they come from the recruiting command they are some of the best officers and staff in subsequent jobs that we have. so you protect the brand. you don't lower your standards and you bring the pros into the game and you will make your mission. >> we're having a very solid recruiting year.

in fact, to the point we have just upped our estimate of what we believe we can assess into the air force this year. and one of the things that has enabled us to be particularly successful is to general mahoney's point, you do not lower the standards, but one of the things that we have done is we have looked at norms. there is a difference between norms and standards. and so we have had a norm that requires drivers licenses. and the youth of today, many of them don't have driver's licenses, which has artificially restricted the recruiting pool. what is the standard that requires a drivers license before you join the air force? and what we've discovered is this is not really a standard for almost all of our career fields. it is just a norm that we have -- we have accepted for years and years. when you strip away things that are frankly not relevant to the

force you are trying to attract, it opens the pool of eligible recruits. in the air force has had a very successful year thus far. >> i would say we all have the same challenges, may be different than the marine corps. in the navy we have to a, one through six years, b is six through 10 and c is 10 beyond. we are good at and c and not b. for recruiting, all hands on deck. what jim talked about, where is their slop in the system. how can i tighten down on the timeline from contact to contract and make that connection. and maybe a re-emphasis on this because it is a super existential threat to all of us that we need to bring in that force. to sustain or force. >> is about getting into the

areas where the coast guard has not recruiting the past and i've been doing this for 40 years and never seen the challenges that we have in recruiting talent. what we're doing is expanding capacity, professionalizing our recruiting and looking to break down barriers to service, not reducing standards but evaluating why we have certain standards. that before may have prevented entry but now don't make sense. color blindness may be one of those standards. there are certain things you can do if you are color blind, but it should not be a barter service. the other thing we are doing our expanding opportunities for people to come in laterally, prior service, or whether you're out there in the private sector and have a particular skill set and want to serve in the coast guard, we will find an opportunity to bring you in. and if you will bear with me , thei mental images think about a jenga tower. if that is what you need for a second class petty officer, you

take someone through the lateral entry program and you look at what pieces they are missing. and then what you do is focus the training enterprise on filling those jenga pieces and you can much more quickly elevate somebody to a second-class petty officer. it is about being smarter about recruiting and retaining talent and we have to speak to people in a different way. from my perspective, young men and women want to know that they can make a difference, that they are valued, that they can serve in unique and different ways and so we are talking about that within the context of the coast guard. >> i know we are at the end of our time but if anybody else wants to jump in on that. >> from a national perspective, a couple of things i would add. one, for all of us, the trajectory is on the eligibility -- are not moving in the right direction and for all of the reasons that have not been described, the joint force is taking a hard look at at how do we recruit, who do we go after, expanded populations, not just high school age but at the micro

level, in the army, it has been very successful for us and to get after his point about standards, physical and mental acuity and cognitive, individual may have tons of aptitude and potential but they may not be there today. so, we bring up your future shoulder prep force and we bring them to our standard which is opened up a whole new set of demographics that we are able to recruit and go after, who have gone on and done very very well and done very very well in the army on the back end of that. >> navy's taken a page out of the army's book. we have not had to course -- the academic course up and ready to understand what our success will be but from a physical perspective, we have 850 sailors we would not of had if we had our own standards. we have a physical course to put you in to get you to that standard because we want you to serve. >> great. thanks to all of you. if you can join me in thanking our esteemed panel. [applause]

we really appreciate all of you coming. just as a reminder, we will take a break right now and at 11:30, in 11 minutes we will have the director of national intelligence that will be on stage. so thanks again to all of you. and we'll be back in 10 minutes. thank you. >> great job. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2024] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> it was great. > today, former congresswoman liz cheney is in conversation with john beauchamp, discussing how leaders can put principles ahead of politics. watch live from the washington national cathedral at 7 p.m.

eastern on c-span. c-span now are free mobile video app, or online at c-span.org. >> by a 32-28 vote, the arizona house of representatives has agreed to repeal a law banning a portion. the state senate must vote to repeal the bill before the ban is knocked up to the old law was revived on ri9 and unless the senate votes to takes action, could take effect within 60 days of the ruling. >> is the vice president for ed choice, here to talk about team views on k-12 education. what is ed choice? guest: